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Constitutional Law-No LAND, No VOTE: VALIDATING THE ONE-
ACRE-ONE-VOTE PROVISION FOR ELECTIONS IN FLORIDA'S COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS-State V. Frontier Acres Community
Development District-472 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1985)
On May 1, 1984, the Board of County Commissioners of Pasco
County, Florida, received a petition from Village Tampa, Inc.,
seeking to establish Frontier Acres Community Development Dis-
trict.1 Pursuant to Florida's Uniform Community Development
District Act of 1980,2 the county commissioners approved the dis-
trict on September 4, 1984.s The district was to be managed by an
appointed five-member board of supervisors until a full board
could be elected.4 By law, the election of the five permanent super-
visors had to be held within ninety days of the district's establish-
ment, and only those who owned land within the district would be
allowed to vote.' Landowners would receive one vote for each acre
of land they owned within the district.6 Those who lived in the
district but owned no land were denied the right to vote for the
district supervisors.
The validation of the district's capital improvement bonds by
the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court was appealed by the state to the
Florida Supreme Court.7 The State Attorney contended that the
statutory voting scheme violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution by failing
to comply with the one-person-one-vote principle.8
In State v. Frontier Acres Community Development District,9
the Florida Supreme Court found the election procedure constitu-
tionally valid. The court relied on recent United States Supreme
Court decisions that carved out an exception to the one-person-
one-vote principle when the elected body is a limited purpose gov-
ernmental unit exercising limited powers and disproportionately
affecting the interests of landowners over nonlandowners. 10 Thus,
1. State v. Frontier Acres Community Dev. Dist., 472 So. 2d 455, 455 (Fla. 1985).
2. Ch. 80-407, 1980 Fla. Laws 1628 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 190 (1985)).
3. Initial Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d 455.
4. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 456.
5. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(2) (1985).
6. Id.
7. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 455.
8. Id. at 456.
9. 472 So. 2d 455, 457. "[N]othing in the equal protection clause precludes the legisla-
ture from limiting the voting for the board of supervisors by temporarily excluding those
who merely reside in the district." Id.
10. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); see also infra notes 127-57 and accompanying text.
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the court permitted a scheme that diluted the votes of small land-
owners and completely disenfranchised residents of the district
who owned no land at all.
Although the result in Frontier Acres is consistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions, the Florida Supreme Court was too will-
ing to find that the district fell within the constitutional exception
to the one-person-one-vote principle without fully analyzing the
powers and impact of such districts. The purpose of this Note is to
examine the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in Frontier Acres
and its application of the equal protection exception created by the
United States Supreme Court. The purpose, powers, and impact of
community development districts will be considered in determin-
ing whether an exception to the one-person-one-vote requirement
is justified.
I. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS IN FLORIDA
During the 1970's, the Florida Legislature sought to control the
burgeoning number of independent special districts in the state.1"
These districts were created under special acts of the legislature or
general laws allowing local citizens to petition to create a special
district. 12 Florida's statutes were strewn with a variety of types of
special districts which often caused fragmented or duplicated ser-
vices between districts and local governments.' 3 Actual and poten-
tial abuses of power by independent districts, bond defaults, and
conflicts between independent districts and local governments
caused the legislature to seek ways to halt the indiscriminate crea-
tion of independent districts. 4 At the same time, Florida's contin-
uing population growth-and the inexorable burden that growth
placed on existing municipal services-caused the legislature to
look for new ways to finance and deliver community services to
new residents.' 5 Rather than abolish independent special districts,
11. See Kynoch & Van Assenderp, Growth Management Through the Uniform Commu-
nity Development Act, 9 FLA. ENVTL. & URn. ISSUES 7 (Jan. 1982). See generally Hudson,
Special Taxing Districts in Florida, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 49 (1982).
12. See Hudson, supra note 11, at 57-58.
13. See Kynoch & Van Assenderp, supra note 11, at 8.
14. Id. Developers sought to establish independent drainage districts as water control
districts under FLA. STAT., ch. 298, as a means to develop large tracts of land. Similarly,
independent road and bridge districts, under FLA. STAT. § 336, and independent water and
sewer districts under § 153.53 were established by developers as a means to sell tax-exempt
bonds to finance these improvements. Other districts such as mosquito control districts
under FLA. STAT., ch. 388 (1973) could be created by public petition. Id.
15. FLA. STAT. § 190.002 (1985). See generally Kynoch & Van Assenderp, supra note 11.
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the Florida Legislature fashioned the community development dis-
trict, which was intended to be a single mechanism for establishing
independent special districts and meeting the service demands cre-
ated by growth."'
The Uniform Community Development District Act of 198017
was an attempt to create an alternative method for financing and
managing the major infrastructures necessary for community de-
velopment. As codified the law is intended to provide a uniform
means by which districts can construct and manage basic commu-
nity development services, such as roads, bridges, water and sewer
systems, and parks.18 The community development district is
designed to coordinate the development of community services
with local governments while remaining consistent with local gov-
ernment plans and policies. 19 The costs of these community ser-
vices are to be assessed against those who benefit directly from the
services."0 However, the creation of a district requires a prior de-
termination of need for the district and its compatibility with ex-
isting community services and local comprehensive plans.2 1 Deliv-
ery of services requires a prior determination by applicable
governmental bodies that the district should provide the services.22
Certain powers are delegated to a community development dis-
trict in order for it to carry out its duty of limited service delivery.
Among its general powers are the right to sue and be sued, enter
16. Ch. 80-407, 1980 Fla. Laws 1628 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 190 (1985)). An
earlier reform effort, the New Communities Act of 1975, FLA. STAT. § 163.603 (1976 Supp.),
remained unused by developers as a means to finance infrastructure in new developments.
Kynoch & Van Assenderp, supra note 11, at 9.
17. Ch. 80-407, 1980 Fla. Laws 1628 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 190 (1985)).
18. FLA. STAT. § 190.012(1) (1985). Other basic services the district could provide include
waste collection, drainage systems, fire prevention, and street lights. Id.
19. Id. § 190.002(2).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 190.005(1)-(2). The creation of a community development district (CDD) of
greater than 1,000 acres requires a determination by the Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission of the need for the district. Id. § 190.005(1). For a CDD of fewer than 1,000
acres, the determination of the need for the district is made by the county commissioners of
the county in which the district would be created. Id. § 190.005(2). The body which ap-
proves the district must consider the following factors when deciding whether to grant or
deny a CDD petition: (1) the truth and correctness of statements in the petition, (2) the
consistency of the district with local or state comprehensive plans, (3) the size, compactness,
and contiguity of the district as related to its ability to be an interrelated community, (4)
the viability of a CDD as the best alternative to deliver community services in the area, (5)
the compatibility of proposed CDD services with the capacity and uses of existing local
community development facilities, and (6) the amenability of the area to separate special
district government. Id. § 190.005(1)(c), (1)(e), (2)(c).
22. Id. § 190.012.
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into contracts, own real and personal property, borrow money, is-
sue bonds, and levy taxes.23 Additionally, a community develop-
ment district may condemn property for district purposes.24 The
special powers of the district extend to the planning, construction,
and operation of the various community services which the district
may provide.2 5
Creation of the district requires a petition endorsed by the
owner or owners of 100% of the real property proposed to be in-
cluded in the district and a designation of five persons to serve as
an interim board of supervisors.26 Once the district is approved
and created, an election is to be held within ninety days to elect a
permanent board of supervisors.2
The election of supervisors of a community development district
occurs at a meeting of the landowners of the district.28 Non-
landowners who reside in the district are not allowed to vote, while
landowners who do not reside in the district may vote. At the land-
owners' meeting, and at subsequent elections, each landowner may
cast one vote for each acre of land he owns within the district.29
This exclusion of nonlandowning residents and the dilution of the
votes of small landowners was the basis of the equal protection
challenge in Frontier Acres.
Depending upon the size of the district, this disenfranchisement
and malapportionment of votes lasts from six to ten years after the
district is established. In districts of fewer than 5,000 acres, elec-
23. Id. § 190.011.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 190.012(1). In 1984, the statute was amended to provide that the planning,
construction, and operation by a CDD of parks and recreational facilities, fire prevention,
local security, schools donated to public use, mosquito control, and waste collection were
only to be undertaken after consent by the local general purpose government. Ch. 84-360, §
9, 1984 Fla. Laws 2106, 2114 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 190.012 (1985)).
26. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a) (1985). The petition is also to propose a name for the
district and include a map and description of the property within a district, a timetable and
estimated cost of construction, a designation of future public and private land uses in the
district, and an economic impact statement. Id.
27. Id. § 190.006(2). Creation of the district by the Land and Water Adjudicatory Com-
mission is by rulemaking pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 120, the Administrative Procedure Act.
id. § 190.005(1). Creation of a CDD by county commissioners is by local ordinance. Id. §
190.005(2). Rules or ordinances creating a CDD must include: the name of the district, a
description of the district's boundaries, and the names of the five interim supervisors. Id. §
190.005(1)(d), (2)(d).
28. Id. § 190.006(2).
29. Id. A fraction of an acre is treated as one acre in allocating votes. Id. The term
"landowner" is defined to include a private corporation. Id. § 190.003(13). In the case of the
Frontier Acres district, Tampa Village, Inc., owned all of the land within the CDD and could
elect all members of the board of supervisors.
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tion of supervisors need not be based on the one-person-one-vote
principle during the first six years; after that period, supervisors
will be elected by all the electors in the district with each having
only one vote.30 In districts of more than 5,000 acres, the change to
one-person-one-vote occurs in elections held ten years after the
district's formation."1 At that point district elections must conform
with the one-person-one-vote principle. Therefore, nonlandowning
residents are denied the right to vote only during the period the
district is being developed. However, this is also the period when
much of the district's bonded indebtedness is likely to be incurred
as community facilities are financed and built. Thus, a community
development district allows a land developer to build infrastruc-
ture with bond funds that must be repaid by residents who move
into the district later, but who can be denied the right to vote for
as long as ten years after the district's creation.
During its 1984 Regular Session, the Florida Legislature
amended the Uniform Community Development District Act to re-
quire that the board of supervisors of a community development
district proposing to exercise its ad valorem taxing power be
elected by all qualified electors in the district, whether or not they
owned land.2 However, a community development district need
not exercise its ad valorem taxing power. Therefore, it may avoid
the statutory requirement for popular election.
30. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a) (1985).
31. Id. After the sixth or tenth year, a supervisor shall be "a qualified elector . . .
elected by the electors." Id. "Elector" is defined as a voter who is a landowner or who re-
sides in the district. Id. § 190.003(11). Although a corporate landowner would apparently
still be allowed to vote in district elections, it would be limited to casting one vote while
nonlandowning residents who are otherwise qualified to vote would be allowed to vote for
the first time.
32. Ch. 84-360, § 6, 1984 Fla. Laws 2106, 2111 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 190.006(3)(a)
(1985)). Previously, a landowner-elected board of supervisors could levy ad valorem taxes on
all taxable property in the district in order to raise funds to retire general obligation bonds.
FLA. STAT. § 190.021(1)(1983). The 1984 amendment did not remove the power to assess ad
valorem taxes; it only required that the board of supervisors of a district levying those taxes
first be popularly elected. Ch. 84-360, 1984 Fla. Laws 2106.
CDD's are empowered to issue revenue bonds, payable from revenues received from the
project so funded. Voter approval of these bonds is not required. FLA. STAT. § 190.016(8)
(1985). The CDD board also may levy benefit taxes to repay bonds issued to finance water
management and control plans in the district. Maintenance taxes may also be levied for
upkeep of these same facilities. These taxes, until paid, are liens on the property assessed.
Id. § 190.021(2)-(3).
Special assessments may be levied against benefited property for the costs of construction
of those community development services the CDD undertakes under authority of FLA.
STAT. § 190.003. These assessments are payable in 20 yearly installments. The assessments
are intended to pay for the major improvements and services undertaken by the district.
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II. VALIDATION OF THE VOTING SCHEME
The Frontier Acres Community Development District comprised
187 acres to be developed into a park for recreation vehicles and
mobile homes.33 Village Tampa, Inc., owned 100% of the land
within the district.3 4 The district was to be developed in eight
phases over eight years with capital improvements, including
streets, water and sewer systems, and recreational facilities.35 The
estimated cost for these facilities was seven million dollars. 0
On May 1, 1984, Village Tampa petitioned the Pasco County
commissioners to establish a district by ordinance, pursuant to sec-
tion 190.005, Florida Statutes. 7 The petition complied with the
statutory provisions required at the time: it described the district
boundaries, exhibited the consent of the owner of 100% of the dis-
trict's lands (in this case, Village Tampa, Inc.), estimated the costs
and timetable for district development, and named a preliminary
five-member board.3 8
On September 4, 1984, the county commissioners adopted an or-
dinance creating the Frontier Acres Community Development Dis-
trict.3 " Before granting its approval, however, the commission im-
posed two conditions. First, the district was to remain a rental
project until its capital improvement bonds were retired. Secondly,
the developer, Village Tampa, Inc., was to guarantee repayment of
the bonds.4 0 The county commissioners were apparently attempt-
ing to avoid some of the problems that had plagued independent
special districts in the past.
During the period in which the proposed district was under con-
sideration by the county commissioners, the Florida Legislature
amended chapter 190, Florida Statutes.41 Among the changes was a
requirement that a petition for a new community development dis-
trict contain an economic impact statement. 2 The amendment ap-
33. Initial Brief for Appellant at 2, Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d 455.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2-3.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 455.
38. Id. at 455-56.
39. Initial Brief for Appellant at 4, Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d 455.
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Ch. 84-360, § 4, 1984 Fla. Laws 2106, 2109 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a)
(1985)).
42. Id. The economic impact statement is to be prepared in conformance with FLA. STAT.
§ 120.54(2) (1985) (requiring an economic impact statement on adoption or amendment of
an administrative rule).
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plied only to districts created after June 29, 1984."' Because Fron-
tier Acres was not created until September 4, 1984, the new
provisions applied." However, no separate economic impact state-
ment was prepared before the county commissioners established
the Frontier Acres district. 5
Shortly after receiving the commissioners' approval, the ap-
pointed board of supervisors authorized the issuance of sixteen
million dollars in special assessment capital improvement bonds.46
The board pledged the proceeds of the district's special assess-
ments to pay off the bonds. The bonds were validated by the
Sixth Judicial Circuit Court' 8 in a proceeding in which the State
Attorney sought to show cause why the bonds should not be
validated.'9
The state appealed the circuit court's validation of the bonds to
the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the statutory one-acre-
one-vote election procedure violated equal protection requirements
by excluding nonlandowning residents.50 The state also argued that
the district was invalidly created because its petition did not con-
tain the statutorily required economic impact statement.51 Citing
Reynolds v. Sims5 2 and subsequent cases, 53 the state argued that
community development districts exercised the type of governmen-
tal powers that caused the Supreme Court to require application of
the one-person-one-vote principle to popular elections for legisla-
tive bodies.5' The weighted voting scheme itself, which allotted one
vote for each acre, was not directly challenged on appeal.
43. Ch. 84-360, § 20, 1984 Fla. Laws 2119.
44. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 457-58.
45. Id. at 457.
46. Id. at 456.
47. "Id.
48. Id. The validation of the bonds occurred under FLA. STAT. ch. 75. Subsequent to the
district board's bond resolution, a complaint was filed in the circuit court to determine the
district's authority to incur bonded indebtedness and the legality of the proceedings by
which the district decided to issue the bonds. The circuit court hearing is also to determine
any issues that may later call into question the validity of the bonds or the district's author-
ity to issue them. FLA. STAT. § 75.09 (1985).
49. Initial Brief for Appellant at 1, Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d 455. See FLA. STAT. § 75.05
(1985) (granting local state attorneys authority to appear in validation proceedings).
50. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 455. Appellate review of bond validations lies in the
supreme court. FLA. STAT. § 75.08 (1985).
51. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 457.
52. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
53. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
54. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 456.
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The Frontier Acres district argued that it did not exercise gen-
eral governmental powers, but instead was a limited purpose gov-
ernmental unit.55 Further, the district argued that the impact of its
operations disproportionately affected district landowners as op-
posed to nonlandowners.56 Because of this limited purpose and dis-
proportionate effect, Frontier Acres contended that it fell within
the exception to the one-person-one-vote principle carved out by
the Supreme Court in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District 7 and Ball v. James.58 Frontier Acres con-
ceded that an economic impact statement was not included in the
petition.59 However, the district argued that it had substantially
complied with the requirement because the county commissioners
considered the district's economic impact before granting the
petition.60
In a six-to-one decision, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that
the district was the type of governmental unit excepted from the
one-person-one-vote principle.61 However, the court found the dis-
trict's creation invalid under chapter 190 because of the lack of an
economic impact statement.2 The court ruled that the statute re-
quires full compliance with this provision for the creation of a
valid district."'
The court determined that the one-acre-one-vote provision was a
valid voting procedure for a limited purpose governmental unit
such as the Frontier Acres district." The court noted that the dis-
trict's narrow statutory purpose was to provide "community infra-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See infra notes 128-140 and accompanying text.
58. 451 U.S. 355 (1981). See infra notes 143-156 and accompanying text.
59. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 458.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 456.
62. Id. at 457.
63. Id. at 458. The court found no evidence in the record that the county commissioners
had in fact considered the requisite elements of the economic impact statement. Id.
This holding is curious in light of Florida courts' demonstrated tolerance toward prepara-
tion of economic impact statements for administrative rules proposed under ch. 120, FLA.
STAT. The legislature required the same elements for an economic impact statement for a
proposed CDD as it did for a proposed agency rule. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a)(8) (1985). The
provision requires the preparation of a detailed economic impact statement. See FLA. STAT.
§ 120.54(2) (1985). However, Florida courts have been willing to uphold the validity of ad-
ministrative rules adopted without the prior preparation of an economic impact statement.
See Florida-Texas Freight v. Hawkins, 379 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1979); Polk v. School Bd., 373
So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
64. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 456.
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structure and to serve projected population growth without finan-
cial or administrative burden to existing general purpose local
governments. 6 5 Further, the court noted that the district's powers
were limited to those necessary for the district to carry out its pur-
pose."6 Also, the court found that the powers exercised by the dis-
trict did not constitute sufficient general governmental power to
require adherence to the one-person-one-vote principle.6 7
Additionally, the court noted that not only were the district's
powers limited in scope, but their exercise had to comply with
state law and local ordinances.6 " District development undertaken
by the board of supervisors had to be consistent and compatible
with local and state regulations and development plans. The exer-
cise of powers was limited to ensuring that sufficient community
development services would be provided for future growth in the
state.6 9
Under the court's analysis, not only were the district's purpose
and delegated powers limited, but the impact of the district's oper-
ations fell more heavily on landowners than on others. 70 The court
concluded that landowners bear the initial burden of the costs of
district projects.7 1 By inference, the court recognized that non-
landowning residents would be affected by the district's operations,
but not to the same extent as would landowners.
Citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Salyer Land Co. and
Ball, the court found the community development district to be a
limited purpose governmental body exercising limited powers, with
the impact of its operations and the burden of its financing falling
to a much greater extent on district landowners. 72 Because the dis-
trict fell within the exception, the court found it reasonable for the
"legislature to have concluded that . . . landowners, to the exclu-
sion of other residents, should initially elect the board of supervi-
sors." 73 Therefore, the court upheld the temporary exclusion of
nonlandowning residents from voting in district elections.74
65. Id. at 457.
66. Id. at 456.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 457.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 456.
73. Id. at 457.
74. Although the weighted voting scheme was not challenged in this appeal, the court
would have likely held it valid under the disproportionate impact rationale.
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III. THE ONE-PERSON-ONE-VOTE PRINCIPLE AND ITS EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has long viewed the right to cast an effective
vote in popular elections as a fundamental right.76 The right to
vote is "the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on
that right strike at the heart of representative government. 76 The
Court has struck down, as violative of equal protection standards,
state schemes which diluted or disenfranchised a qualified voter's
right to vote." Each vote is to be accorded the same weight as any
other vote.78 Restrictions on the right to cast an equal vote must
serve a compelling state purpose before those restrictions will be
upheld.7 9 Applying the principle of "one person, one vote"80 and
the piercing light of strict scrutiny," the Supreme Court has struck
down restraints that unreasonably denied an effective vote.s2 How-
ever, in two recent cases the Court has created an exception of un-
certain dimensions which allows dilution of voting power or out-
right disenfranchisement when the election is for a special purpose
governmental unit which disproportionately affects those allowed
to vote. s The Florida Supreme Court looked to this exception
when it upheld the election scheme for the Frontier Acres Commu-
nity Development District.
75. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-10 (1978).
76. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 579.
79. Id.
80. The phrase "one person, one vote" originated in Justice Douglas' majority opinion in
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). "The conception of political equality from the Decla-
ration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote." Id. at 381.
81. Under the strict scrutiny test, state restrictions on fundamental rights must serve a
compelling state interest and employ the least restrictive alternative in fulfilling that inter-
est. See L. TRIBE, supra note 75, at § 16-6-16-8. This standard of review is also applied
where suspect classifications, such as race, are employed to deny equal protection. In cases
involving suspect classifications, the Court's application of strict scrutiny has proven fatal to
most restrictions of such rights. However, where voting rights are involved, the Court has let
stand voting restrictions based on age and residency; it has applied a balancing test between
the state's interest in the restriction and the burden placed on the right to vote. See Com-
ment, Equal Protection and Due Process: Contrasting Methods of Review Under Four-
teenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HAMv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 529, 537-41 (1979). Although the
scrutiny applied by the courts is exacting, it is not as demanding as the scrutiny applied to
suspect classifications. Id. at 561-62.
82. See infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
83. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
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A. Dilution of Voting Strength
The landmark case of Baker v. Carr84 established that an equal
protection challenge to a state's apportionment of seats in its legis-
lature presents a justiciable controversy which may be adjudicated
in federal court.86 Two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims,8" the Court
invalidated a sixty-year-old Alabama apportionment plan.8 7 The
Court held that the "Equal Protection Clause requires that the
seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be appor-
tioned on a population basis." '8 A population-based apportionment
plan assures "[flull and effective participation by all citizens in
state government" through the exercise of "an equally effective
voice in the election of members of [the] state legislature."8 9 The
Court stated that the right to vote preserves other basic civil and
political rights and therefore an alleged infringement of this right
requires careful scrutiny. 0
The Court extended the equal apportionment requirement to lo-
cal government legislative bodies in Avery v. Midland County.9 1 In
Avery, a local citizen challenged the unequal distribution of popu-
lation among districts for the five-member Midland County, Texas,
Commissioners Court.92 The city of Midland, with ninety-five per-
cent of the county's population, was completely within one district;
the remaining population was apportioned among three districts. 3
The fifth member was elected at-large and voted only in the event
of a tie.94 The Supreme Court held that this allocation of voting
84. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
85. Id. at 233.
86. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
87. Id. at 568.
88. Id. The Court went on to find that the dilution of the right to vote based on a
malapportioned legislature was unconstitutional. Id. For example, if 1,000 voters lived in
legislative district A and 10,000 lived in district B, and each district had one representative,
the voters in district A would have ten times the voting strength of the voters in district B.
The dilution occurs by this overvaluing or undervaluing of votes between districts. Dilution
of voting also occurs where certain voters cast more votes than others, such as where votes
are allocated on a one-acre-one-vote scheme. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1975).
89. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565. The Court did not require perfect apportionment of legis-
lative districts but permitted slight deviations in population between districts. "[T]he over-
riding objective must be substantial equality of population . . . so that the vote of any citi-
zen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." Id. at 579.
90. Id. at 562.
91. 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968).
92. Id. at 475-76.
93. Id. at 476.
94. Id.
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strength offended equal protection standards. 95 The Court saw lit-
tle difference, for purposes of the equal protection clause, between
the power exercised by state legislatures and the power exercised
by local governments.96
The Court looked to the powers exercised by the local govern-
ment and its impact on local citizens before concluding that equal
protection standards applied.9 7 The Court concluded that the
Commissioners Court had the "authority to make a substantial
number of decisions that affect[ed] all citizens" of the county."
Equal protection standards, therefore, required that the commis-
sioners' districts have substantially equal populations. 9
However, the Supreme Court intimated that were this not a gen-
eral governmental unit with authority over an entire geographical
area, it might reach a different conclusion regarding voting appor-
tionment.100 The Court reserved the question of whether "a spe-
cial-purpose unit of government . . . affecting definable groups of
constituents more than other constituents. . . may be apportioned
in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected
by the organization's functions."'01
In Hadley v. Junior College District,'0 2 the Supreme Court was
unwilling to accept the argument that the election of trustees for a
junior college district fell within the apparent exception mentioned
in the Avery dictum. The Court found that the trustees of a junior
college district in metropolitan Kansas City, Missouri, exercised
general governmental powers with impacts throughout the dis-
trict.'0 3 Although the trustees' powers were less broad than those
of the Commissioners Court in Avery, the Court held that their
powers were sufficiently important to invalidate the Missouri stat-
95. Id. at 480-81.
96. Id. at 481. The Court rejected the argument that equal apportionment of elected
local governments was not required where an equally apportioned state legislature exercised
control over the local government. The Court found that much policy-making power was
delegated to such governmental units. Id.
97. Id. at 483-84. Among the powers the Commissioners Court exercised were setting of
local tax rates, equalization of property assessments, issuance of bonds, adoption of a county
budget, and planning for the future development of Midland County. Id.
98. Id. at 484.
99. Id. at 484-85.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Court suggested that it would not be an obstacle "in the path of innovation,
experiment, and development among units of local government." Id. at 485.
102. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
103. Id. at 53-54. The powers exercised by the district's trustees included the power to
levy and collect taxes, issue bonds, hire and fire teachers, discipline students, make con-
tracts, condemn land, and, in general, manage the junior college's operation. Id. at 49.
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utory scheme which apportioned members of the trustees among
various districts.'0 4 The Court noted that education, the sole pur-
pose of the district trustees, has traditionally been treated as a vi-
tal governmental function, suggesting that this factor contributed
to the Court's ruling.'05
The Hadley Court held that, as a general rule, adherence to the
one-person-one-vote principle is required whenever a state selects
by popular vote officials who exercise general governmental pow-
ers.106 However, the Court went on to suggest that where the offi-
cials' duties "are so far removed from normal governmental activi-
ties and so disproportionately affect different groups. . a popular
election in compliance with Reynolds might not be required."10
Thus, in spite of a strong rule that a'popular election must con-
form to the one-person-one-vote principle, the Court hinted again
at the possible exception identified in Avery. A governmental unit
with limited functions not affecting the rights and interests of per-
sons not allowed to vote apparently might not be subjected to the
strict scrutiny applicable to the one-person-one-vote principle.
B. Disenfranchisement
In a separate line of cases, the Supreme Court applied the one-
person-one-vote principle to overturn state restrictions on the right
to vote. In Kramer v. Union Free School District,'"° the Court
struck down a New York statute limiting the vote in school district
elections to landowners or lessees and parents of district school
children. The Court applied strict scrutiny to the statute and
found that once the state decides to elect public officials by popu-
lar election, it must conform to equal protection standards. ' The
state could not allow certain individuals to vote and not others,
104. Id. at 53-54. The Missouri statute apportioned the six trustees among local school
districts within the larger junior college district based on the number of persons between six
and twenty years old. The Kansas City School District, with 60% of the persons in that age
group, was only apportioned 50% of the trustees, or three of the available six seats. Id. at
51.
105. Id. at 57.
106. Id. at 50-51.
107. Id. at 51.
108. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
109. Id. at 626. "[SItate apportionment statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness of
some citizens' votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court. .. No less rigid an examination
is applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens . Id. (citations omitted) (em-
phasis in original).
19861
196 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:183
absent a compelling state interest for the restriction. 10 The New
York statute was not sufficiently tailored to the state's goal of re-
stricting the right to vote to those "primarily interested" in school
affairs."' However, the Court refused to express an opinion on
whether New York could in some circumstances restrict the right
to vote to those "primarily affected.""12 The Court suggested that
the validity of such a classification depended on whether those dis-
enfranchised were "substantially less interested or affected" than
those allowed to vote." s The Court thus acknowledged the possi-
bility of an exception to the one-person-one-vote principle in dis-
enfranchisement cases similar to the one suggested in the malap-
portionment cases.
In three subsequent cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny and
found property ownership requirements for voters unconstitu-
tional. In Cipriano v. City of Houma,"" a Louisiana law granted
the vote in municipal utility revenue bond elections only to prop-
erty taxpayers. The Court found that the law violated the equal
protection clause because it failed to promote a compelling state
interest. 15 Further, the bonds were paid by revenues from utility
customers regardless of whether they owned land.1'6
In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,"7 the Court invalidated an Arizona
scheme which limited voting in general obligation bond elections to
those who paid property taxes. The Court concluded that all resi-
dents had a substantial interest in the improvements and would be
substantially affected by the election.1' 8 Because there were insuffi-
cient differences between the interests of landowners and non-
landowners, the Court ruled that the classification scheme was not
constitutionally justified. "
110. Id. at 633.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 632.
113. Id.
114. 395 U.S. 701 (1969). This decision was issued the same day as Kramer.
115. Id. at 706.
116. Id. at 705.
117. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
118. Id. at 209. The bonds issued could be used to finance various municipal improve-
ments, such as parks and recreation facilities, sewer systems, and public safety buildings.
The bonds were to be paid off by property taxes, although the city had the right to retire
the bonds using other sources of revenue. Id. at 205-06.
119. Id. The Court noted that although property tax revenues might be the sole source
of debt service on the general obligation bonds, the tax would be indirectly reflected in
rental payments. The fact that any new taxes used to retire the bonds would be passed on to
tenants in the form of higher rent established that nonproperty owners were sufficiently
interested in the elections to be allowed to vote. Id. at 210-11.
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Hill v. Stone1 0 involved a 1972 Fort Worth, Texas, election to
approve general obligation bonds for city improvements. 12 1 The
voting scheme required approval by a majority of those voting who
had also made real or personal property available for taxation.
1 22
The Supreme Court, following its decision in Kramer, struck down
these state and local restrictions." 3 The Court rejected the city's
argument that this was a "special interest" election, noting that it
had previously held a general obligation bond issue to be of general
interest because the improvements benefited all residents.1 24 Addi-
tionally, the state could not meet the Court's compelling interest
standard under strict scrutiny so as to justify discriminating be-
tween voters who owned and declared taxable property and those
who did not. 2 Further, although landowners had the burden of
repaying the bonds through property taxes, the Court suggested
that these taxes are passed on to tenants and others indirectly and
thus the burden of repayment fell on a wider class of people than
those who were permitted to vote.126
120. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
121. The election was held to obtain voter approval of bonds to improve the city transit
system and construct a public library. Id. at 292.
122. Id. at 291-92. The Texas Constitution provided that in elections to endorse issuance
of municipal bonds, only those who owned taxable property could vote. The implementing
statute provided that the voter "render" property for tax purposes before being allowed to
vote. Id. at 291. Rendering property required the owner to report it to the local tax assessor,
who would list it on the tax rolls. Taxable property that could be rendered included real,
personal, or mixed property. Id. at 291 n.1. The Fort Worth City Charter restricted electors
in bond elections to otherwise qualified voters who also paid taxes on property within the
city. Id. at 292.
Following Kramer, Texas established a dual voting scheme in an effort to preserve subse-
quent bond elections in the event the state and local restrictions were later found unconsti-
tutional. This procedure required property-owning voters to cast their ballots in one box
and other registered voters to cast theirs in a second box. Approval of the bond issue re-
quired a majority vote of those who owned taxable property (the votes in the first box) and
a majority vote of all those who voted (the votes in both boxes combined). Id. at 292.
In the Fort Worth election, the transportation bond issue received the required majorities,
but the property-owning voters rejected the library bond issue, although it was approved by
a majority of all voters. Thus, the library bond issue was deemed not to have been approved.
Id. at 293.
123. Id. at 300.
124. Id. at 297. In Kolodziejski, the Court held that a city could not restrict the right to
vote in general obligation bond elections to only those voters who paid local property taxes.
125. Id. at 300. The city sought to defend the scheme by arguing that the restriction
encouraged otherwise reluctant property owners to render their property so as to qualify to
vote in bond elections. The Court found this unconvincing because a person need only de-
clare a small amount of his property in order to qualify to vote in bond elections; the
scheme did not require disclosure of all taxable property in order to vote. Id. at 299-300.
126. Id. at 299.
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C. An Exception to the One-Person-One-Vote Principle
Finally, in two cases challenging the voting requirements in
western irrigation districts, the Supreme Court was squarely
presented with the opportunity to describe the parameters of the
exception it had suggested in the earlier cases. Once the challenged
provision was found to fall within the exception, the Court relaxed
its standard of review by applying a rational relationship test and
sustained the voting restrictions.12 7
In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dis-
trict,1 28 the Supreme Court sustained a California statute which
permitted only landowners within a water storage district to vote
in elections for district supervisors.2 9 By statute, each landowner
was entitled to cast one vote for every $100 worth of land he owned
within the district.130 Thus, the statute diluted the votes of small
landowners and barred nonlandowning residents from voting in
district elections altogether."'
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six-member majority, found that
the issue presented was the one the Court had reserved in Avery:
127. Unlike the strict scrutiny test, the rational relationship test is highly deferential to
the legislative purpose behind the challenged law. If the Court can perceive any rational
purpose behind the statute, the Court will sustain it. The test allows legislation, particularly
in the area of economic regulation, a presumption of constitutionality in the face of an equal
protection challenge. A finding that the rational relationship test attaches is tantamount to
a finding of constitutionality. See L. TRIBE supra note 75, at § 16-2; see also Note, Ball v.
James and the Rational Basis Test: An Exception to the One Person-One Vote Rule, 31
AM. U.L. REV. 721, 732 (1982).
128. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
129. Id. at 734-35. The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District was created under
California law to acquire, appropriate, divert, store, conserve, and distribute water. Id. at
723. Additionally, the district had the authority to generate and sell hydroelectric energy
incidentally produced by the district's water storage and distribution activities. The district
consisted of 193,000 acres of fertile farmland, 85% of which was cultivated by four corpora-
tions. The district population was comprised of 77 individuals, most of whom worked for
one of the four corporations. Id.
Districts such as the one in the Tulare Lake Basin were created in response to the inabil-
ity of local governments to meet irrigation needs for extensive farming in the American
West. These districts, with their powers to assess district costs against landowners and to
obtain tax-exempt financing, have flourished during the twentieth century. With these pow-
ers, the districts have constructed and maintained large water storage and diversion projects
in vast tracts of land. See Leshy, Irrigation Districts In A Changing West-An Overview,
1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 345; Note, Desert Survival: The Evolving Western Irrigation District,
1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 377.
130. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 724-25.
131. However, the California law did not require that landowners reside in the district
before they could vote in district elections. CAL. WATER CODE § 41000 (West 1966). A corpo-
rate landowner could vote through an agent authorized to vote on the corporation's behalf.
Id. at § 41004.
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whether a "special purpose unit of government" with functions af-
fecting "definable groups of constituents more than other constitu-
ents" may be apportioned so as to give greater influence to those
most affected by the governing body.132 The Court answered this
question in the affirmative.1 3 First, the water storage district was
found to be a special purpose district with relatively limited au-
thority even though it possessed some traditional governmental
powers.134 In spite of these powers, the district did "not exercise
what might be thought of as 'normal governmental' authority.' 35
Not only was the district created for a special purpose, its opera-
tions disproportionately affected landowners."36 All district costs
were assessed against land and borne by the landowners in propor-
tion to the benefits received from district operations. 37 Any delin-
quency of payments resulted in a lien on the landowner's property
until paid."3 8 Because landowners bore the entire cost of the dis-
trict's operations, the California Legislature "could rationally con-
clude that [the landowners], to the exclusion of residents, should
be charged with responsibility for its operations" and allowed to
vote for its directors.1 39
Thus, the Court was able to fit the Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District within the exception suggested in Avery, Hadley,
and Kramer, and thereby sustain restrictions on, and dilution of,
the franchise. The Court refused to extend the general rule that
voting is a fundamental right which requires application of strict
132. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Avery, 390 U.S. at 483-84).
133. Id. at 728.
134. Id. The district's primary purpose was to supply irrigation water to agricultural
lands. The district board of supervisors had the power to acquire property by purchase and
other means, CAL. WATER CODE § 43500 (West 1966), or by condemnation, id. § 43530; to
contract and cooperate with other governmental units to carry out district projects, id. §
43151; to employ a district staff, id. § 43152(c); and to issue bonds, id. § 45400.
135. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 729. The Court noted that the district provided no
other general public services typically funded by local governments, such as schools, public
roads, housing, and utilities. The district did not supply police or fire protection nor did it
provide facilities intended to improve the quality of life in the district. Id. at 728-29.
136. Id. at 729. The Court recognized that nonlandowning residents of the district might
be affected by the district's operations. But this effect was too indirect to find that the
California law was less than reasonable given the disproportionate effect on landowners as a
group. Id. at 730-31.
137. Id. at 729.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 731. The Court inferred a rational purpose for the law, finding that the "Cali-
fornia Legislature could quite reasonably have concluded" that the voting scheme was nec-
essary to attract the support of landowners. The landowners may have been reluctant to
support creation of the district unless they and other landowners were assured virtual con-
trol of the district. Id.
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scrutiny to any restrictions.14 0 Instead the Court was willing to
sanction the district's weighted voting system and voter qualifica-
tions in district elections because the water storage district was a
limited purpose unit of government and its operations dispropor-
tionately affected landowners as a group.14 The Salyer Land Co.
decision provided a basis for several state courts to endorse prop-
erty qualifications for voters in various types of special districts.14 1
In Ball v. James,43 the Supreme Court was presented with a
second challenge to property-based voting restrictions, this time
regarding an Arizona water supply district. 4 4 The Court reaffirmed
and expanded the Salyer Land Co. exception to the one-person-
140. The Court distinguished the statutes challenged in those "strict scrutiny" cases as
having gone too far in granting the right to vote to some who were directly affected while
denying it to others who were also directly affected by the respective governmental unit's
operations. Id. at 726-28. The Court also noted that some such governmental units exercised
general governmental powers to which the one-person-one-vote principle would apply. Id.
141. Justice Douglas dissented. Id. at 735 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He maintained that
the burdens of the district fell upon nonlandowning residents in the form of potential per-
sonal effects from district operation of irrigation and flood control systems. Justice Douglas
thought the district exercised sufficient governmental authority that had impact throughout
the district so as to insure the applicability of the one-person-one-vote principle in district
elections. Justice Douglas also strongly objected to the right of corporations to control the
district's board of directors through the use of their land holdings in the district and the
votes those holdings represented to the exclusion of district residents. Id. at 738-42.
On the same day, the Supreme Court decided Associated Enters. v. Toltec Watershed
Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973). There the Court upheld a Wyoming law which
allowed only landowners to vote in elections to create the district via a weighted voting
scheme based on the number of acres of land owned. The Court found the district to be a
limited purpose governmental unit which had a disproportionate effect on landowners. Fur-
thermore, the district had been created pursuant to legislation enacted by the Wyoming
Legislature, a body in which all voters were fairly represented. Also, the watershed district
had to be approved by the popularly elected supervisors of the local soil and water conserva-
tion districts. Id. at 744-45.
142. See Philippart v. Hotchkiss Tract Reclamation Dist., 54 Cal. App. 3d 797, (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976) (reclamation district's weighted voting scheme based on land values and permit-
ting only landowners to vote not in violation of equal protection); Simi Valley Recreation &
Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 51 Cal. App. 3d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)
(local park and recreation district provided a single service and exercised limited powers, so
limiting franchise to those affected valid); Chesser v. Buchanan, 568 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1977)
(tunnel district within the Salyer Land Co. exception due to district's special purpose and
the disproportionate burden on landowners). But see Choudhry v. Free, 552 P.2d 438 (Cal.
1976) (property qualifications for candidates for board of directors of an irrigation district
invalidated after distinguishing Salyer Land Co.). See also Johnson v. Lewiston Orchards
Irrigation Dist., 584 P.2d 646 (Idaho 1978) (property qualification for irrigation district vot-
ers invalidated because district substantially affected all city residents).
143. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
144. The challenged statute permitted the district to limit voting in elections for district
directors to otherwise qualified voters who owned land in the district. Each landowner was
allowed to cast one vote for each acre of land owned in the district. AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
45-909, 45-983 (Supp. 1984).
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one-vote principle. 4 5 The Court held that the primary purpose of
the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dis-
trict-to conserve and deliver water-was sufficiently narrow and
limited to fall within the exception."" The district's powers, al-
though greater than those exercised by the water storage district in
Salyer Land Co.," 7 were not the type of governmental powers that
invoke the strict requirements of the one-person-one-vote princi-
ple."48 The district could not enact local laws controlling the con-
duct of residents; it could not impose ad valorem or sales taxes; nor
did it perform the "normal functions of government," such as the
maintenance of streets, the provision of health and welfare ser-
vices, or the operation of public schools."49
Not only was the Salt River district's legislative purpose a nar-
row one, but its impact fell disproportionately on landowners
whose lands were subject to liens securing district bonds and who
supplied the district's capital needs through property assess-
ments. 150 While the Court realized that the district's operations af-
fected nonlandowning residents, its concern was whether the im-
pact was disproportionately felt by landowners.'" If so, the state
could reasonably decide to allow only landowners to vote in district
elections and to make the weight of the vote dependent upon the
size of their landholdings. 52
The Court emphasized that the district was essentially a "busi-
ness enterprise, created by and chiefly benefiting a specific group
145. Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
146. Id. at 370.
147. Id. at 365-66. "[Tlhe services ...provided by the ...District are more diverse
and affect far more people" than those discussed in Salyer Land Co. Id. at 365. The Arizona
district served one-half of the residents of the state whereas the district in Salyer Land Co.
served an area with only 77 residents. The Salt River district generated hydroelectricity,
becoming one of the largest electric utilities in the state and meeting most of its capital and
operating costs for water supply through sales of electricity. As much as 40% of the dis-
trict's water was supplied for ultimate consumption by urban, non-agricultural consumers.
Id.
148. Id. at 366.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 370.
151. Id. at 371. The nonlandowning challengers to the district voting scheme pointed to
the district's major electric utility operation, which accounted for 98% of the district's oper-
ating revenues and was used to pay for the district's water operations. Id. at 370 n.19. The
Court responded that the electric utility was a business operation, and the relationship was
one of consumers and private supplier and not one of citizen-voter and governmental unit.
Id. at 370. Further, neither the existence of this utility enterprise nor its size made the
district a governmental unit. The Court noted that the supply of electricity is not a tradi-
tional governmental service. Id. at 368.
152. Id. at 371.
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of landowners. ' 153 However, as nominal public bodies, the districts
were able to pursue inexpensive public bond financing of district
projects.1 54 In fact, the Court stated that the sole legislative pur-
pose in making the water district a public entity was to enable it to
obtain interest-free financing. 15 5 This quasi-public flavor, however,
would not raise the district to the level of a public body to which
the one-person-one-vote rule would apply.156
In Salyer Land Co. and Ball, the Supreme Court refused to rec-
ognize that voting was a fundamental right which attached to all
public elections. Instead, the Court looked first at the nature of the
elected body to determine whether it was a general governmental
unit. If so, equal protection required that the election be held on a
one-person-one-vote basis. If the body was a limited purpose one,
the Court determined the impact of the body on those affected by
its activities. If the impact was disproportionate on one group of
people, those persons could be allowed a voice in the body's affairs
to the exclusion of those less affected.
In developing this two-part analysis of special purpose/dispro-
portionate impact, the Court has not formulated a bright line by
which other courts may determine when the one-person-one-vote
principle applies. A case-by-case determination of whether the ac-
tivities of the district are those of a general governmental unit is
the only analysis possible under Salyer Land Co. and Ball. Defin-
ing which activities are traditional governmental activities per-
formed by a general governmental body becomes a burden the
challenger must bear. 5 The election scheme, therefore, enjoys a
presumption of validity even when it openly dilutes or disen-
franchises voting power.
IV. APPLYING THE EXCEPTION TO FRONTIER ACRES
The lesson of Salyer Land Co. and Ball is that the reviewing
court must closely examine the purpose of the governmental body
and the powers it exercises to determine whether it is a general
purpose unit of government. A finding that the body is a general
governmental unit invokes strict scrutiny of any denial of equal
protection and results in application of the one-person-one-vote
153. Id. at 368.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 369.
156. Id. at 368.
157. See Note, Expanding the Special District Exception to the 'One Person, One Vote'
Requirement: Ball v. James, 35 ARK. L. REV. 702, 720 (1982).
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principle. A finding that the body is one of limited purpose invokes
the rational relationship analysis which will sustain a denial and
dilution of votes in the body's affairs in almost any conceivable
scenario. Unfortunately, although the Florida Supreme Court
reached a sound result, its examination of the Frontier Acres Com-
munity Development District was superficial. The court's decision
would have been more cogent had it included analysis like that
conducted by the Supreme Court in similar cases.
Typically, the Supreme Court examines in detail the powers of a
governmental unit that impact on the quality of life or control in-
dividual conduct. 158 In Ball, the Court went so far as to list the
powers the Salt River district could not exercise, thereby implicitly
defining those powers that would be considered general govern-
mental powers.1"9 Those powers include the power to control pub-
lic conduct by law and to administer typical governmental func-
tions, such as operating schools, maintaining streets, and providing
health, welfare, and safety services.18 0 Powers such as these, resting
at the core of sovereignty, are deemed sufficient to invoke equal
protection standards. 6 ' When they are absent, the Court is more
likely to find that the governmental entity fits within the exception
to the one-person-one-vote rule. In Salyer Land Co., the Court
concluded that the irrigation district's limited services and absence
of general governmental powers meant that it did not supply ser-
vices that significantly affected its residents' quality of life.' 2
The Florida Supreme Court's analysis, by contrast, was based on
a finding that the Frontier Acres district had the narrow purpose
of providing needed community development services and facilities
to accommodate new growth while ensuring that those who bene-
fited most from the services bore most of the cost.' 3 But in deter-
mining whether the Frontier Acres district's elections should com-
ply with the Reynolds rule, the court did not closely examine the
158. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 728-29. The Court listed the district's powers
as the power to hire a staff, to contract for construction of district projects, to condemn
property, and to cooperate with other agencies. Id. at 728 n.7. Further, the district did not
provide general public services, such as schools, housing, transportation, roads, or other ser-
vices typically financed by a local government. Id. at 728-29.
159. Ball, 451 U.S. at 366.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 729.
163. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 457.
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powers the district could exercise nor how those powers might re-
late to the district's limited purpose. "
Some powers vested in community development districts under
Florida law-for example, the authority to build and maintain
roads'165-resemble powers which the Supreme Court has suggested
are municipal powers. In Salyer Land Co. and Ball, road construc-
tion and maintenance were described as general governmental
powers. 6' Similarly, community development districts can con-
struct and operate sewage waste collection systems.'67 In Ball, this
task was suggested to be a typical governmental function. 6 8 A de-
termination that a limited purpose government exercised one or
more of these powers could arguably cause it to be subject to the
one-person-one-vote principle. Rather than address the constitu-
tional implications of this grant of power to the district, however,
the Florida Supreme Court summarily concluded that the district's
powers were not sufficient to require adherence to Reynolds. 69
When the powers of a community development district are
viewed within the context of the entity's purpose, it seems fair to
say that the district does not independently exercise general gov-
ernmental powers that implicate the equal protection clause. Ar-
guably, the Frontier Acres district could be said to provide directly
municipal services that improve the quality of life for all residents,
and therefore the one-person-one-vote principle should govern dis-
trict elections. However, the district in fact only provides a means
to finance and construct facilities that the local government could
have required the developer to provide if the land had been devel-
oped without the benefit of a community development district. A
community development district must comply with growth plans
adopted by the popularly elected local government.'7 0 Thus, the
actual decisions regarding the quality of life in the district are
made by that general governmental body; a community develop-
164. Cf. Ball, 451 U.S. at 366; Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 728-29.
165. FLA. STAT. § 190.012(I)(c) (1985).
166. Bail, 451 U.S. at 366 ("[N]or does ... [the district] administer such normal func-
tions of government as the maintenance of streets."); Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 728-29
("The district provides no other general public services such as ... transportation . . . [or]
roads.").
167. FLA. STAT. § 190.012(I)(b) (1985).
168. Ball, 451 U.S. at 366.
169. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 457. The Court concluded that the district's powers
merely implement the narrow purpose the legislature granted the district, that of ensuring
that new residents have adequate community services. Id.
170. FLA. STAT. § 190.004(3) (1985).
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ment district therefore does not improve the quality of life for its
residents.
Moreover, the community development district's activities have
a disproportionate impact on landowners in the district. As the
Florida Supreme Court concluded, the costs of district operations
are borne initially by the district landowners. 171 In a community
development district such as Frontier Acres, there will be few, if
any, residents in the district during the initial years of the develop-
ment. Thus, the costs of repaying any district bonds through spe-
cial assessments will be carried by the landowners in the district in
proportion to the extent their land is benefited. 172 Additionally, in
the early stages of development there would be few or no residents
of the district to participate in district elections. Thus, from a
practical point of view, to hold an election in which only residents
could vote would mean holding an election in which there could be
no eligible voters.
The Florida Legislature recognized that the nature of commu-
nity development districts changes over time. The ultimate conver-
sion of district elections from per acre to per person voting demon-
strates a perception that the impact of a district does not continue
to affect landowners disproportionately. At some point in time, the
effects of district operations and financing must be felt by all resi-
dents of the district, not just landowners. The district is no longer
a business entity that is a nominal public agency created to benefit
landowners. It becomes a body affecting the interests of all resi-
dents, regardless of whether they own property. This approach is
consistent with the view taken by several western courts when the
effects of irrigation districts began to affect nonlandowners to a
greater extent than when the district was first created. 173 The
Frontier Acres court found this temporary exclusion to be valid,
and it pointed to the conversion in district elections as further jus-
tification for a relaxed equal protection standard. This statutory
change helped the court avoid the question of whether an indefi-
nite one-acre-one-vote scheme would have been valid.
V. CONCLUSION
The limited purpose government exception to the one-person-
one-vote rule may be unsettling to those who view the franchise as
171. Frontier Acres, 472 So. 2d at 457.
172. FLA. STAT. § 190.022 (1985).
173. See Choudhry, 552 P.2d 438; Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 584 P.2d 646.
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a fundamental right that must be protected against any infringe-
ment. However, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that there are limits to this principle. In Salyer Land Co. and Ball,
the Court broadly defined that limit and refused to require equal
apportionment and a universal franchise in elections for govern-
mental bodies that fulfilled a narrow purpose and disproportion-
ately affected certain persons. Such an exception was upheld for
single-purpose irrigation districts which served large areas in west-
ern states.
In Frontier Acres, the Florida Supreme Court was asked to de-
cide whether a state law could exclude nonlandowning residents
from voting for supervisors of a community development district.
The court said such residents could be excluded given the limited
purpose the districts were created to serve. However, the court
failed to examine closely the powers of the district administrators
before deciding that community development districts were limited
purpose districts. In spite of this shortcoming, the result would
have been the same if the court had considered the district's pow-
ers. For in the end, the court would have concluded that this was
not a general purpose government, but merely a business masquer-
ading as a public body in order to take advantage of lower interest
rates on public bonds.
Douglas S. Roberts
